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PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
ADDING APPELLATE CAPACITY TO THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM: A NATIONAL COURT OF APPEALS OR AN
INTER-CIRCUIT TRIBUNAL?
A. LEO LEVIN*
Change in the structure of the federal judicial system comes slowly.
This is true even of less-than-monumental adjustments: the creation of a
new circuit, the consolidation of two existing courts.' Major structural
• Director, Federal Judicial Center; B.A. 1939, Yeshiva College; J.D. 1942, University
of Pennsylvania; L.L.D. 1980, New York Law School.
I The Eleventh Circuit was created by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 3254, to take effect October 1, 1981. See 28
U.S.C. § 41 (1981). "As early as March 1964 the Judicial Conference of the United States had
adopted a resolution that the Fifth Circuit be split into two autonomous circuits."
Ainsworth, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, 1981-B.Y.U. L. REv.
523, 531 (footnote omitted). This division of the Fifth Circuit into two circuits was recom-
mended in 1973 by the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System
(generally known as the Hruska Commission after its chairman, Senator Roman L. Hruska)
in its initial report. See 62 F.R.D. 223, 230-34 (1974). Of course, recommendations for division
of the circuit had preceded creation of the Commission itself. See D. BONN, THE
GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
(1974) (history of division of Eighth Circuit into Eighth and Tenth Circuits). The Hruska
Commission also had recommended dividing the Ninth Circuit, but no legislative action yet
has been taken to implement this recommendation. Instead, the Congress authorized crea-
tion of administrative units within the then Fifth Circuit and the current Ninth Circuit and
added special provisions related to sitting en banc. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. II 1978).
Consolidation of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
has passed in separate bills of both houses of Congress and is currently awaiting conference
approval. See S. 1700, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (tabled by Senate on December 18, 1981);
H.R. 4482, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (passed in House as reported in H.R. Rep. No. 97-312,
on November 18, 1981) (amended by Senate and passed as amended on December 8, 1981).
The legislation is intended, among other things, to solve problems relating to forum shop-
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change involving the United States Supreme Court occurs very rarely.2
This is as it should be; the role of the federal judiciary in our society, and
certainly the role of the Supreme Court, is too important to allow for
easy tinkering. But the country continues to change rapidly; the role of
federal law continues to expand, and the problems presented for judicial
solution become more complex, mirroring the development of economic
and technological forces we can only dimly understand.' The world
shrinks even as our population grows, presenting novel issues for
decision by federal judges. On the domestic front, new problems for
judicial resolution follow expanding notions of how best to protect
against impermissible discrimination, whether based on race, religion,
sex, or age.' Again, all this is as it should be.
At some point, however, it becomes necessary to pause and inquire
whether our courts as presently constituted can accommodate the
changing scene and meet the new demands. There are times when
change is essential to conserve basic values; the failure to make adjust-
ments often leads to total breakdown. In a very real sense, stringent
adherence to a policy of no-change serves to effect far-reaching change,
adverse in its impact and not readily controlled.
For well over a decade, legal literature has reflected a deep concern
with the capacity of the federal judicial system to function smoothly and
effectively, particularly with respect to maintaining uniformity in the
ping in patent cases which have long been the subject of concern. See COMMISSION ON REVI.
SION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 369-71 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as COMMISSION REPORT]. See also The Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, May 9, 1979, "A Talk Show-A Federal Ap-
pellate Court with Exclusive Patent Jurisdiction: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?," 84
F.R.D. 429, 465-82 (1979); House Committee on the Judiciary, Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit Act of 1980, H.R. Rep. No. 96-1300, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-21 (1980); see
generally Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-1981: Hearings on H.R. 2405 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
2 See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 258-60
(1927) [hereinafter cited as FRANKFURTER & LANDIS].
' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 204. See also id. at 404-05 (views of Justice
Blackmun, "The country has grown and surely it has become more complex."); F. COFFIN,
THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 247 (1980) [hereinafter cited as COFFIN].
' Civil rights cases, exclusive of prisoner petitions, comprise a significant portion of
all the civil litigation filed in the United States district courts. In 1981, 15,419 such cases
were filed, a record high which constituted 8.5 percent of civil findings (180,576). Within the
broad category civil rights cases, employment discrimination and "general civil rights"
cases have shown the largest increases in recent years. Employment discrimination filings
reached 6,245 cases in 1981, reflecting a 249.4 percent increase over 1973. During the same
period, general civil rights cases increased by 63.8 percent. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF




national law.' Senator Howell Heflin of Alabama, a formidable figure in
state judicial administration reform before his election to the Senate,
and Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice of the
Committee on the Judiciary in the House, have recently introduced
legislation addressing these concerns.' Hearings have been held; the
process of congressional consideration has begun.' It is a propitious time
to examine both the nature of the problem and the solutions that have
been proposed.
Adjusting to the Increase in Caseload
In examining the present situation it is helpful to think of the federal
judicial system as a pyramid. At the base are the United States district
courts. In 1960, filings in the'district courts were approximately 60,000.8
In 1981, over 211,000 cases were filed.' As filings increase in the federal
trial courts, it is possible to add additional judges, and the Congress has
done so." The Congress also has provided additional support by way of
magistrates." Moreover, judges have increased their productivity
See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 542 (1969); AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 6-8
(1968).
, S. 1529, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), was introduced by -Senator Heflin on July 29,
1981, and was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 4482, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981), was introduced by Congressman Kastenmeier on September 15, 1981, and was
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives. On January 29, 1982,
as this article was going to press, Senator Heflin introduced S. 2035, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982), providing for the appointment of a Chancellor of the United States to be Presiding
Judge of the National Court of Appeals, "a judge and administrator who will be directly
responsible to the Chief Justice of the United States." 128 CONG. RC. S. 222-25 (daily ed.
Jan. 29, 1982). The Chancellor would be appointed from judges serving on active duty as
members of the United States circuit courts of appeals. His appointment would create a
vacancy on the court on which he had been serving. All other judges sitting on the National
Court of Appeals would serve in addition to their other duties.
" Hearings on S. 1529 Before the Subcomm. on Courts. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981).
' Civil cases filed in the United States district courts during 1960 totaled 59,284.
Criminal filings (original and transfer) totaled 29,828. See DIRECTOR'S REPORT 1981, supra
note 4, at 56, 94.
' There were 201,387 cases filed in the United States district courts during 1981. AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 129 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 STATISTICS]. Of these, 180,576
were civil cases. Id.
," The Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629, authorized
the creation of 117 district court judgeships. 28 U.S.C. § 133 (Supp. H 1978).
'! The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 (Act), 28 U.S.C.A. § 631 (Supp. 1981). Though
the total number of United States Magistrate positions has remained almost unchanged
since the Act became law on October 10, 1979 (increasing by only five positions to 490 in the
spring of 1981), there has been a codtinuing shift from part-time service to service on a full-
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significantly.'2 I do not mean to minimize the problems facing the district
courts, but it seems fair to say that they are far more tractable than
those facing the United States courts of appeals and the United States
Supreme Court.
The United States courts of appeals comprise the next level of the
pyramid. The increase of filings in these courts from 1971 to 1981 was
almost exactly one hundred percent;1 3 from 1961 to 1981, the increase
was close to five hundred percent." Here, too, some remedies have
alleviated what would otherwise have become a totally intolerable
situation. First, new procedures such as no oral argument in many cases,
fewer opinions, and mechanisms for increasing settlements have contri-
buted to increased productivity. 5 The Congress, too, has added judge-
ships'" and provided for an additional circuit. 7 As caseloads continue to
time basis. The effect of this shift on productivity is not yet clear. The legislation called for
a study of the magistrate system and the submission of a comprehensive report to the Con-
gress by January, 1982. See DIRECTOR'S REPORT 1981, supra note 4, at 27.
" See COFFIN, supra note 3, at 247. Discussing the performance of the judiciary in re-
cent years, Coffin states: "As for judges, I cannot help thinking that the judiciary, both
state and federal, has, in the past dozen years, dramatically extended its quantitive output
per judge in an era when the law was becoming ever mote complex-a collective job per-
formance that I suspect is unrivaled in the history of the judicial profession."
For the United States district courts, the total number- of cases terminated per
judgeship increased from 311 in 1969 to 384 in 1981. 1981 STATISTICS, supra note 9, at 129;
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 120 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 STATISTICS] (comparison with
1969).
S In 1976, 12,788 cases were filed in the United States courts of appeals, and in 1981,
23,362 cases were filed in these courts. See 1981 STATISTICS, supra note 9, at 45.
" In 1961, 4,204 cases were filed in the United States courts of appeals. See ADMINI-
STRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORTS ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES - ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 144 (1961).
"' For the United States courts of appeals, the total number of appeals terminated per
judgeship has increased dramatically from 93 in 1969 to 570 in 1981. See 1981 STATISTICS,
supra note 9, at 13; 1974 STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 13.
The increase in productivity by the judges of the courts of appeals is evidenced by the
following table:
CASES TERMINATED PER JUDGE
Circuit 1962 1970 1973 1976
5th 65 126 191 210
2d 61 131 162 216
4th 52 161 239 191
9th 52 1i7 165 198
See Shuchman & Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can Judges Select
Cases of "No Precedential Value"?, 29 EMORY L.J. 195, 221 (1980). See also COFFIN, supra
note 3, at 247.
16 The Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 authorized the addition of 35 new circuit court
judgeships. See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (Supp. II 1978).
17 Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (Supp.
1981); see note 1 supra.
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mount, still more judgeships will be required, and a variety of additional
innovations and adjustments will have to be explored.
At the apex of the pyramid, the United States Supreme Court, the
figures are no less dramatic. In its 1951 term, the Court had 1,353 cases
on its docket. 8 Last term the Court's docket listed 5,144 cases;,
understandably, there is serious question whether the Court is able to
give adequate consideration to all the cases among those 5,144 that are
deserving of decision.
These raw numbers alone understate the situation, because addi-
tional factors have compounded the problem. First, as already noted, our
society has become more complex as have the issues presented to the
Court. Second, the Supreme Court is not only at the apex of the federal
court system; in a very real sense, it is at the apex of a second pyramid.
This second pyramid has for its base the courts of the fifty states, and
the United States Supreme Court is at the apex with so much of the
business coming from the state courts.0 The Supreme Court must re-
solve, with finality for the entire country, issues of federal law that come
to it without ever having been part of the workload of the United States
district courts or courts of appeals.
Further, as must be clear on a moment's reflection, solutions which
are applicable to other federal courts do not apply to the United States
Supreme Court. There can be no sitting in panels; realistically, there can
be no increase in the number of Justices. Some ameliorative steps can be
taken, e.g., legislation eliminating the obligatory or mandatory appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to give it more control over how it
disposes of its own docket. All sitting members of the Court in recent
years formally expressed support for this step, and fortunately, Con-
IS ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORTS ON THE PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 197 (1956).
19 DIRECTOR'S REPORT 1981, supra note 4, at A-1. In a recent interview, the Chief
Justice was asked whether it bothered him that the Supreme Court had filled its oral argu-
ment docket for the 1981 Term before Christmas, "with six months still to go before argu-
ment." He responded: "Yes. In my 13 years on the Court, this is the first time we have ever
filled the term's docket in the first three months of the term. Interview with Warren E.
Burger, Unclogging the Courts-Chief Justice 'Speaks Out, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT,
Feb. 22, 1982, at 39.
Appeals from state courts are provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1)-(2) (1976). Of the
4,371 cases docketed in the Supreme Court during the 1971-72 term, 1,341 (30.7%) came
from the state courts. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE
CASELOADOF THE SUPREME COURT, 57 F.R.D. 573, 620 (1972). See generally Casper & Posner,
A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J. LEGAL STUDIES 339, 351 (1974); G. CASPER &
R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1976). The Supreme Court's state court
burden has been about 1,000 cases a year for the last decade. Stolz, FederalReview of State
Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need for Additional Appellate Capacity, 64
CALIF. L. REV, 943, 975 (1976).
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gress is considering legislation to this effect." Such legislation, however,
is likely to provide greater relief to lower courts and to litigants than to
the Supreme Court itself.
The Supreme Court has already developed summary proce-
dures - elimination of oral argument and decision without opinion - and
it uses them extensively even in cases that federal statutes require the
Court to review on the merits. Clearly, such decisions hardly can be ac-
corded the same weight as those arrived at after plenary consideration
and explained by an opinion. The Supreme Court has recognized as
much.2 For this reason, dismissal for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion currently is considered more akin to a denial of certiorari than to a
substantive determination that no substantial federal question was sub-
mitted."
Analogous to dismissal for want of a substantial federal question is
the summary affirmance. The significance of the summary affirmance is
dramatically illustrated in the pages of the United States Reports,
"When we summarily affirm ... we affirm the judgment but not neces-
sarily the reasoning by which it was reached," Chief Justice Burger
wrote. 4 "Indeed," he added, "upon fuller consideration of an issue under
plenary review, the Court has not hesitated to discard a rule which a line
of summary affirmances may appear to have established."'
A whole literature has developed as to the meaning of the summary
21 S. Rep. No. 95-985, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1978) (letter to Senator DeConcini from
the nine justices of the Supreme Court urging adoption of S. 3100, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978) (Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act of 1978) to limit the Supreme Court's mandatory ap-
peal jurisdiction). This bill did not become law. Similar legislation is now pending in the
form of S. 1531, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (hearing held November 16, 1981) (to provide
greater discretion to Supreme Court in selecting cases for review).
I See text accompanying note 25 infra.
3 Address by Mr. Justice Marshall, Federal Bar Council Annual Law Day Dinner
(May 1, 1975) (transcript on file in WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW office):
[I]n state cases we have the option of dismissing the appeal for want of a substan-
tial federal question. But that, too, creates problems. If we are taken
literally-god forbid-our dismissal for want of a substantial federal question
means that the question was judged so insubstantial that it doesn't even rise to
the level of federal cognizance. Yet we have construed the same words-a
substantial federal question-very liberally in determining what is substantial
enough to require the convening of a three-judge district court.
Id at 10; see note 26 infra.
24 Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C. J., concurring).
2 Id. at 392. In one of the instances cited by the Chief Justice, the Court disapproved
the holdings of three summary affirmances stating that it did so after further consideration
of the issue following briefing and argument. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671, reh.
den., 416 U.S. 1000 (1974). The Court also disapproved, to the extent inconsistent with its
decision, an orally argued case, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro the
issue had been raised and decided in the lower court, and was presented to the Supreme
Court on appeal, but it was not "refer[ed] to or substantively treat[ed]" in the Supreme
Court's opinion. 415 U.S. at 670.
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dispositions. 6 That these procedures have involved substantial uncer-
tainties in the lower courts and penalties to litigants is obvious. More
than that, the procedures illustrate how hard-pressed the Court obvious-
ly has felt when it deals in this fashion with cases in which the Congress
has provided for an appeal as of right. What has-happened with respect
to appeal as of right speaks more dramatically than any other arguments
about whether the Court can do more than it is currently doing, whether
the Court needs relief, or whether the Court can discharge all of its
obligations fully under the present system.
Inadequate Federal Appellate Capacity and Its Consequences
It is well to restate the basic question that emerges from the data
concerning burgeoning caseloads and the effects of the summary proce-
dures adopted by the court in the effort to cope. That question may be
framed as follows: Is there today adequate capacity in the federal
judicial system to maintain clarity and coherence in the national law? It
is this question that was addressed by the Commission on Revision of
the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska Commission)' and is the
subject of legislation currently pending in the Congress.28 In simpler,
perhaps simplistic terms, the question is whether the Supreme Court is
able to do all that needs to be done, or are too many questions of federal
law left unanswered for too long-again with unfortunate results for
litigants who are entitled to and would like to have definitive answers to
pressing, practical questions? Properly analyzed, the question inquires
whether our system would be improved substantially by the creation of
a national court of appeals or an inter-circuit tribunal.
The nature of the problem perhaps is best illustrated by two opin-
ions in the recent case of Brown Transport Corp. v. Atcon, Inc.' The first
opinion is by Justice White, with whom Justice Blackmun joined, dis-
"' See Levin & Hellman, The Many Roles of the Supreme Court and the Constraints of
Time and Caseload, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 399, 402-27 (1976). See generally Note, The Preceden-
tial Effect of Summary Affirmances and Dismissals for Want of a Substantial Federal
Question by the Supreme Court After Hicks v. Miranda and Mandel v. Bradley, 64 VA. L.
REV. 117 (1978); Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: The Significance of
Limited Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U.L. REV. 373 (1972); Impact of
the Supreme Court's Summary Disposition Practice on Its Appeals Jurisdiction, 27
RUTGERS L. REV. 952 (1974); text accompanying note 25 supra.
2 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1. The membership of the Commission included-ap-
pointed from the Senate, in addition to Senator Hruska: Senators Quentin N. Burdick,
Hiram L. Fong, and John L. McClellan; appointed from the House: Congressmen Jack
Brooks, Walter Flowers, Edward Hutchinson, and Charles E. Wiggins; appointed by the
President: Emanuel Celler, Dean Roger C. Cramton, Francis R. Kirkham, and Judge Alfred
T. Sulmonetti; appointed by the Chief Justice: Judge J. Edward Lumbard, Judge Roger
Robb, Bernard G. Segal, and Professor Herbert Wechsler. The author served as Executive
Director.
' See S. 1529, H.R. 4482, supra note 6.
2 439 U.S. 1014 (1978).
1982]
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senting from the denial of certiorari in this very prosaic case. The ques-
tion for decision was "whether failure by [a common] carrier to comply
with the time limits prescribed by [federal regulation] estops the carrier
from collecting the freight charges. ... -1 The question had been
litigated a number of times, both in state and federal courts, and the
courts had divided on the issue. The issue was certainly not of great na-
tional moment, but for the litigants it was an important question. In the
abstract, it raises the question of whether it is equitable for federal law
to vary depending on geography, providing for one set of rights in one
part of the country and denying them elsewhere. To put the point dif-
ferently, should federal laws governing taxes or federal entitlements be
different in Georgia than in Oregon?31
A single instance is inevitably of limited significance. Justice White,
however, did not restrict his opinion to the case before the Court. He
took up instead the entire conference list, the first for that term of
Court, noting how very few cases are granted review.2 The opinion in-
cludes some six printed pages of cases, and the questions then pre-
sented, in which certiorari was denied despite conflicts with decisions of
either federal and state appellate courts, or arguable conflicts with
United States Supreme Court opinions. Notably, these cases were
drawn from only one list at the beginning of one term. The Chief Justice,
who did not join in the dissent, nonetheless filed a memorandum opinion
indicating his view that the problem was pressing and that with the
enlargement of the federal judiciary as a result of the Omnibus Judge-
ship Act, the demands on the United States Supreme Court, particularly
with respect to assuring consistency in the federal law, would be even
more pressing in the future.'
As the number of cases on the Supreme Court's docket increases,
the percentage granted review continues to diminish. This is because
the Supreme Court has determined that it cannot be expected to take
any more cases than it presently does, and maintain quality. 5 Forty
years ago the figure stood at 17.5 per cent, five years ago it had dropped
to 3.6 per cent and there is every indication that the percentage will con-
tinue to diminish. The regional courts of appeals are becoming courts of
last resort.
Id. at 1014-15.
3' See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 206-07.
439 U.S. at 1016.
Id. at 1017-21. The significance of conflicts as an important consideration governing
review on certiorari is illustrated by Rule 17(1}(a) of the Revised Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States, effective June 30, 1980, and the prodecessor Rule 19(1)(b), both
reflecting the long-standing policy of the Court.
439 U.S. at 1025-32.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 394, 404, 401 (letters of Chief Justice
Burger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice White, respectively).
' In 1941 there were 951 petitions for certiorari acted upon by the Supreme Court of
which 166, or 17.5 percent, were granted. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY
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If our interest in the administration of justice includes dispensing
justice promptly and efficiently to the litigants, it is helpful to explore
the implication of the inability of the system to maintain clarity and
coherence in the national law. Dean Erwin Griswold, who served in
distinguished fashion as Solicitor General of the United States, illus-
trates what is involved by describing a problem in the valuation of
mutual funds in a decedent's estate for tax purposes. The regulations
issued were tested in the Tax Court, in four courts of appeals, and in a
district court in the Fifth Circuit. Ten years after promulgation of the
regulations the United States Supreme Court held them invalid. With
the question coming up in -"connection with thousands of estate tax
returns every year," it is understandable that until the issue was finally
resolved "thousands of cases [were] held in abeyance, and much bootless
administrative conference and litigation [was] engendered" 7-at
substantiil cost to the government and to the taxpayers.
Under our present system, relitigation of the same issue in one cir-
cuit after another, in some instances by the taxpayer, in others by the
government, is to be expected. At times the government seeks an inter-
circuit conflict because only in that way can it hope to be granted a hear-
ing-and a favorable ruling-by the Supreme Court. Understandably,
much of the discussion of the lack of appellate capacity on a national
level tends to focus on unresolved inter-circuit conflicts and conflicts be-
tween state and federal lower courts on issues of national law." The
failure of the United States Supreme Court to hear cases squarely
presenting such conflicts, and to resolve the disputed issues, is certainly
the most dramatic evidence of the serious deficiency in the present
system. The Congress, the Court, and the public have all expected that
in the exercise of its certiorari authority the Court would continue to
perform the important function of maintaining uniformity in the national
law in the types of cases described above. 9 One does not fault'the Court
GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 580, 615 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Freund Report]. In 1980 there were 5,144 cases on docket of which 183
were granted review that term. See DIRECTOR'S REPORT 1981, supra note 4, at A-1.
See J. HowARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 57-58 (1981). In a
section entitled The Finality of Circuit Decisions, Professor Howard analyzes the data and
concludes: "By 1975, the ratio of certiorari petitions granted was less than 1 percent of deci-
sions appealed.... Formally, therefore, the three Courts of Appeals became courts of last
resort in 98.1 percent of this cycle of federal appeals and made decisions that prevailed in
98.6 percent. Courts of Appeals are mini-Supreme Courts in the vast majority of their
cases." Id at 58.
3 Griswold, The Supreme Court's Caseload. Civil Rights and Other Problems, 1973 U.
ILL. L.F. 615, 630; 1 COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, SE-
COND PHASE, 192-93 (1974) (hearings) (testimony of Erwin Griswold).
3, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 206, 227-33, 281-98.
" Regarding the Supreme Court's role in settling inter-circuit conflicts, the Hruska
Commission Report stated:
The resolution of inter-circuit conflicts is widely regarded as a primary function of
our one national court, and it was so long ago that the leading treatise on the jur-
1982]
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by recognizing that it simply has not done so; it has been too busy with
issues of higher priority."
It is important to recognize, however, that square conflicts in
authority, what have been termed "direct" conflicts, are not the whole
story. Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to consider them as a mere
tip of the iceberg. A large number of "partial" conflicts,' authorities that
state opposing principles, albeit in cases that are distinguishable on
their facts4 require lawyers to give contingent business counseling.
Once again, the result is relitigation of the same issue in a number of
courts.
The price of inadequate capacity, however, is not limited to cases in
which a conflict, direct or partial, actually develops. Posit for a moment
that one circuit after another interprets a statute-any federal stat-
ute-in identical fashion. Until enough circuits have spoken, the law is
still uncertain; counselling remains problematic, relitigation is invited.'
Finally, there are those areas of the law where monitoring of the applica-
tion of law to fact-as is noted below with regard to patent litigation-is
necessary.
isdiction of the Supreme Court could declare unequivocally that where there is a
direct conflict between two courts of appeals on an issue of federal law, the
Supreme Court grants certiorari as of course, and irrespective of the importance
of the question of law involved.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 221. See also note 32 supra, and particularly the
Supreme Court rules cited therein. The representation to the Congress, framed in terms of
procedure, is thus described by the Freund Study Group:
Passage of the Judges' bill of 1925 followed upon representations by the
Court that it intended to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction through the 'Rule of
Four,' that is, by permitting the vote of only four Justices to bring a case before
the full Court. Permitting a minority of the Court to require plenary review was
based, first, on the concept that if so substantial a number of Justices (though a
minority) wanted to hear a given case, a grant was an appropriate act of discretion
for the Court as a whole. Further, at the time the Act of 1925 was adopted, fear
was expressed that the Court would undertake to hear too few cases. Relaxation
of the usual rule that the majority acts for the Court was therefore considered
particularly appropriate for actions committing the Court only to hear a case.
FREUND REPORT, supra note 36, at 606. Of course, it has long been understood that the Court
was free to allow an issue to "percolate;" thereby allowing the issue to be considered in dif-
ferent cases, typically with varying factual context, in a number of different courts. In
short, the Court traditionally has avoided resolution of conflicts on difficult, sensitive con-
stitutional issues. Nothing in the legislation currently pending would change this, for the
new tribunal would acquire jurisdiction only by reference from the Supreme Court.
,0 See text accompanying notes 20-26 supra (discussion of summary dispositions in
cases in which Congress has provided for appellate review as of right).
" Partial conflicts can be classified into two types: strong partial conflict-a case in
which the decision below is in the same general area of the law as some other case and
where the implications of the doctrine followed in one case would compel an opposite result
in the other; and weak partial conflict-a case which involves some degree of letigimacy in
the claim of conflict but in which the conflict is more attenuated than in the strong partial
conflict category.
'z See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 298-300.
4 See id. at 208-09.
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Attitudes differ as to fhe seriousness of the problems resulting from
the lack of capacity for definitive declaration of federal law. Often these
differences result from differences in perspective and concern. Those
who focus on the plight of litigants, on the cost of repetitive litigation, on
the difficulties of counseling-or of socially unproductive tactics, design-
ed to take advantage of real or hoped-for conflict-see a problem of
serious dimension. Those who focus on whether society is threatened by
wasteful procedures, by differing tax burdens, and by inconsistent
judicial holdings concerning entitlements tend to view the present situa-
tions as tolerable, one not yet presenting a compelling case for remedial
action.
There should, however, be agreement on at least one point: the test
for whether or not remedial legislation is called for should not be
whether the situation has already reached that level of crisis that the in-
evitable delay in effecting some change will be intolerable. The time to
fashion solutions should come long before then. The proper question is
whether our system would be substantially improved by some new tribu-
nal that would add appellate capacity at the national level.
The Views of the Justices
In 1975, when the Hruska Commission had all but completed its
work, before publication of its report recommending the creation of a na-
tional court of appeals, it invited each of the then-sitting Justices to sub-
mit his view for the record, and these statements were published as an
appendix to the report. Perhaps the need for an additional court is best
summarized by the statement of Justice White, who wrote: "For myself,
I am convinced that there is a substantial number of such cases [that
should be decided by a national court of appeals] and that there are
enough of them to warrant the creation of another appellate court, at
least on a trial basis."4
Justice White's statement is particularly interesting for he wrote
from a perspective of more than ten years of service on the Supreme
Court, years during which the pressure of Supreme Court business had
resulted in an increase in the number of cases the Court accepted for
plenary consideration, to the point that Justice White suggested reduc-
ing the number heard and decided by a third.45
Justice Powell described himself as in substantial accord with the
views expressed by Justice White," and Justice Rehnquist stated: "The
Commission has made out a convincing case for the creation by Congress
of a national court of appeals along the general lines described in your
report."' 7 The Chief Justice wrote the Commission: "Up to now I have
" Id at 401.
Id at 402.
' Id. at 406.
' Id. at 407.
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neither advocated the creation of an intermediate court nor expressed
any view, but I have no hesitation in stating, now, that if other remedial
measures are not adopted, the creation of such a court is inevitable." 8
The Chief Justice elaborated on this view at some length in 19754" and
took occasion, in the Brown Transport opinion referred to above, to
reiterate it in 1978.50
The Justices, of course, could not be oblivious to the new stringency
in accepting cases forced upon them by the pressures of volume. The
point is made forcefully by Justice Blackmun who wrote: "Some of us
here worry about the cases that we barely do not take, namely, those
that almost assuredly would have been taken twenty years ago. The
country has grown and surely it has become much more complex."5
Justice Stewart, in 1975, stated that he thought it likely that the day
would come when a new court would be needed, and certainly the sub-
stantial increase in the size of the federal judiciary and in the volume of
cases points to the need for examining whether that time has not
already come.2 Of course, there were-and still are-those in the Court
who disagreed, namely Justices Douglas, Brennan,- and Marshall."
Justice Brennan's statement is particularly interesting for he wrote
from a perspective of twenty years of service on the Supreme Court,
years during which the pressure of Supreme Court business had re-
sulted in an increase in the number of cases the Court accepted for
plenary consideration. Nevertheless, Justice Brennan stated there was
no need for another court, a statement he was lead to repeat in Brown
Transport in light of the Chief Justice's intimations to the contrary.5 It
is interesting to note, however, that even among some who disagreed
with the Commission's proposal, there was recognition of a need for pro-
viding additional capacity for consistency in federal law, albeit a view
that alternative, less drastic remedies would be preferable, at least in
the first instance. Justice Marshall's call for "a few well-placed changes
in jurisdictional statutes" is illustrative.55
Id. at 399.
t Id. at 394-99.
Brown Transport Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. at 1029.
5' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 405.
I& at 400. In an interview published in the January 1982 issue of THE THIRD
BRANCH, Justice Stewart stated that he was still opposed to a national court of appeals, but
was not unhappy "that all this attention has been given to the problem because I think it's a
problem that may be a continuing one and may be an increasing one." Interview with
Justice Potter Stewart, 14 THE THIRD BRANCH 1, 6, 9 (January, 1982).
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 400 (Justices Douglas and Brennan).
Id at 403 (Justice Marshall). The literature, too, reflects a diversity of views. See,
e.g., REPORT OF THE DEPT. OF JUSTICE 'COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
17-20 (opposing creation of a national court of appeals). For a review of the diverse
views in this area, see AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, PROPOSALS
FOR A NATIONAL COURT OF APPEALS (1977).
Brown Transport Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. at 1032 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 403.
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Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction" The United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
Although Congress has not acted to create a national court of ap-
peals, the concept of restructuring appellate jurisdiction in the effort to
address at least some of the problems resulting from inadequate appel-
late capacity has gained substantial congressional support. In December
1981, the Senate passed a bill that would merge the Court of Claims and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals into a thirteenth court of ap-
peals, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.57 A
similar bill had already passed the House,58 but differences remained to
be resolved in conference. The new court would be vested with exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in all cases brought under the patent law so that a
suit for patent infringement tried in the Northern District of Illinois, for
example, would be appealed to the new tribunal rather than to the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 9
Exclusive jurisdiction in a single court was designed as a legislative
response to widespread forum shopping among patent litigants. "[M]ad
and undignified races," Judge Henry Friendly describes them,"...between
a patentee who wishes to sue for infringement in one circuit believed to
be benign toward patents, and a user who wants to obtain a declaration
of invalidity or non-infringement in one believed to be hostile to them."6
The new court would be expected to provide guidance and monitoring,
not only with respect to patent doctrine, but of even greater signifi-
cance, to assure conformity among trial courts in the application of doc-
trine to the specific facts of the case to assure reasonable uniformity in
the administration of the patent laws.
Would the creation of such a court obviate the need for a national
court of appeals? Patents, along with federal taxation, had long been
pointed to as an area of the law in which lack of uniformity was par-
ticularly troublesome. Patent cases figured prominently in the discus-
sion of the need for additional appellate capacity in the final report of
the Commission on Revision, and if the Congress had refused to provide
a single forum for review of patent cases, a national court of appeals
would have been expected to deal with the problem of lack of uniformity.8
The fact is, however, that the number of patent cases that the Supreme
Court might have been expected to refer to a national court of appeals
would not have been large. As already noted, the major difficulty in the
patent field has been the monitoring of the application of doctrine to the
facts of the particular cases, rather than the resolution of inter-circuit
conflicts in the articulation of doctrine. In his 1975 study of conflicts
S. 1700, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
H.R. 4482, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).'
S. 1700, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1295 (1981).
H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 155 (1973).
01 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 369-71.
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brought to the United States Supreme Court, Professor Floyd Feeney
found that there were only three patent cases in a sample of ninety direct
conflicts.2 The demonstrated need of lack of capacity in the system for
the prompt and efficient declaration of the national law on a national
basis will not be met by the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
however salutary its impact in the resolution of the problems with which
it is intended to deal.
Establishment of this new court of appeals deserves analysis from
yet another perspective. Does the attempt to create the new court repre-
sent a new willingness to accept alternative approaches to assuring
uniformity in the federal law, such as specialized courts and exclusive
jurisdiction of a single appellate court for all cases arising under a par-
ticular statute? The proposal was vigorously opposed by the American
Bar Association (A.B.A.) on the ground that it would create a specialized
court, violating a principle of judicial administration that the A.B.A. con-
siders important." The argument is unpersuasive, and indeed has not
persuaded the Congress, largely because the make-up of the docket of
the new court could in no sense be viewed as specialized. To the cases
already being heard by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, hard-
ly limited to patent cases, there would be added the varied workload of
the Court of Claims. The total number of additional patent cases from
the district courts can be expected to constitute only a small percentage
of the new docket." The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit could hardly qualify as a specialized court.
Centralizing appeals concerning identified subject matter is a
valuable technique, one utilized earlier in the Federal Communications
Act, 5 specialized economic programs, 6 and the legislation developed in
response to the failure of the old Pennsylvania Railroad. 7 Such cen-
tralization can serve to alleviate some of the more pressing problems
resulting from what would otherwise be near-intolerable problems of
inter-circuit conflicts. Indeed, Justice Marshall, in expressing his opposi-
tion to the creation of a national court of appeals, urged resort to ex-
62 Id. at 311.
See Hearings, supra note 1, at 71-95.
6, Data on file at the Administrative Office of the United States Courts show that
there were only 120 patent appeals in the United States courts of appeals in statistical year
1980. The Court of Claims that year had 697 cases filed, including Indian litigation, actions
by federal employees, and government contract cases among others. The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals had 169 filings, including customs, commerce, international trade litiga-
tion, and trademark cases.
6 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1976).
See Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 796 (1970), as
amended by The Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 211,
85 Stat. 743, 748-50 (1971) (creating Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals of the United
States).
" See Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, § 209, 45 U.S.C. § 719 (1976).
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clusive appellate jurisdiction in some fields as an avenue to be explored
as a possible solution."
As must be evident, however, exclusive appellate jurisdiction is of
relatively limited utility in terms of pervasiveness of the present lack of
capacity in the federal appellate system. The subject matter of litigation
in which conflicts continue to arise is simply too varied for exclusive ap-
pellate venue to provide an adequate solution. 9 Moreover, with respect
to one of the more troubling areas, federal taxation, Congress has for
good and valid reasons consistently refused to change the present
jurisdictional patterns, evidencing particular resistance to any effort to
take these cases out of the regional courts of appeals7
Fashioning a Solution: The Feasability of Reference Jurisdiction
It would be ironic indeed if the remedy to a problem rooted in the
Supreme Court's inability to assume further burdens were to add to
those burdens. Central to the proposal of the Hruska Commission to
create a national court of appeals is the provision that the new court be
vested with jurisdiction to hear cases referred to it by the Supreme
Court.7 1 It has been aptly termed "reference jurisdiction." The only way
the new tribunal would receive cases for adjudication would be by order
of the Supreme Court itself. Nor is this provision a minor technicality, a
detail introduced in the drafting stage. It is a necessary corollary of the
principle that access to the Supreme Court shall not be curtailed, and it
is precisely this provision that distinguishes the Hruska proposal from
that of the Freund Study Group Report of 1972.72 No one would screen
the cases presented to the Justices for review except the Justices them-
selves. They would retain for adjudication whatever cases they chose to
hear and decide; no individual, no group of judges would bar access.
This provision has led some to argue that the burden of deciding
whether to refer or not to refer would create another decision point for
the Justices, adding to their burden and defeating the purpose of the
proposal itself." It is tempting to speculate, and to argue the theoretical
U See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 403.
See id. at 235-36, 281-98.
70 But see Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153
(1944); Del Cotto, The Need for A Court of Tax Appeals: An Argument and a Study, 12 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 5 (1962).
71 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 239.
72 See FREUND REPORT, supra note 36, at 590-95. The Freund Study Group recommend-
ed that a national court of appeals screen all petitions filed for review in the Supreme Court,
then certify to the high court a number of cases to be further screened and approved. Cf.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 239-47; Haworth & Meador, A Proposed New Federal
Intermediate Appellate Court, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201, 206-08 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Haworth & Meador].
,3 Haworth & Meador, supra note 72, at 208; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at
274-75.
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possibilities, but on this issue we have the views of the Justices
themselves. Even so vigorous an opponent of the proposal to create a na-
tional court of appeals as Justice Brennan, noted in his comments to the
Commission that he "was unable presently to perceive any reasons indi-
cating that [the] proposed reference jurisdiction would be unworkable."'
Not one Justice, proponents or opponents, expressed a contrary view."
This testimony is the more persuasive because the Commission had in-
deed recommended a second source of jurisdiction, transfer jurisdiction,"
and a number of the Justices, Justice Brennan among them," took occa-
sion to express either reservations or opposition to this aspect of the
proposal.
7 8
A Permanent Court or an Inter-Circuit Tribunal?
Even if the need for additional appellate capacity for definitive
resolution of issues of federal law is persuasively demonstrated, and the
feasibility of reference jurisdiction established, a host of issues remain
concerning the specifics of an appropriate court. The most obvious
response is creation of a new tribunal, a permanent court composed of
Article III judges appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate . 9 Details can be filled in with relative ease: number of judges,
provision for sitting only en bane rather than in panels, seat of the court,
provision for sitting elsewhere, and choice of a name. ° What may be viewed
as start-up problems can be more difficult, but hardly intractable: shall a
single president be empowered to select the membership of the full
court, with the risk that its members will reflect a common ideological
cast?8' Shall some of the judges be selected initially from the circuit
courts, to sit for a term until the full permanent membership of the court
is in place? These are details, important and potentially of far-reaching
significance, but legislative proposals have been developed, 2 alter-
natives are available," and choices can be made without serious risk to
the functioning of the new tribunal.
"' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 400 (views of Justice Brennan).
"' Id. at 394-409.
7 Id. at 241-47, 404.
" Id at 400.
78 Id. at 402, 406, 408.
" Id at 236-38.
80 d
" One possible scheme of appointment of a new appellate court would allow the Presi-
dent to appoint only three members of the court, with the others sitting by designation of
the Chief Justice until, perhaps four years later, three additional permanent appointments
are made by the President.
" The Act of Congress creating a new appellate court could provide for a pattern of
appointment similar to that described in note 81 supra and could further prescribe re-
quirements with respect to those sitting by designation. For example, designation might be
limited to active judges of the courts of appeals who had already served for a minimum of
five years, with no two designated from the same circuit.
" See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 401 (views of Justice White).
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An imposing array of distinguished jurists, while recognizing the
need for a new tribunal, have cautioned against immediate creation of a
permanent new court, preferring instead what has been variously termed
an inter-circuit tribunal, a multi-circuit court, of appeals, 5 or a rotating
panel for the resolution of inter-circuit conflict." Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger,' the late Judge Harold Leventhal,8 Chief Judge Frank Coffin, 9
then-Chief Judge Floyd Gibson," Chief Judge Donald P. Lay, 1 and, most
recently, Judge Carl McGowan92 all have recommended some form of this
approach as a preferable alternative to the creation, ex nihilo, as it were,
of a national court of appeals.
Common to these proposals is the basic idea that the judges of the
new tribunal should be experienced jurists from within the federal
system, judges sitting on the various courts of appeals who would accept
this new assignment either as an additional duty or for a term of years.
Closely associated with this basic idea are the convictions that so radical,
an innovation should be introduced on an experimental basis,93 that the
enabling legislation should include a sunset provision,' and that the
court be tested in the crucible of experience before being made a perma-
nent fixture. 5 One or another of these ingredients, in varying forms and
with varying modifications and embellishments, is found in each of the
alternative proposals that have been suggested.
Four reasons are urged in favor of choosing some lesser remedy
than creation of a permanent court interposed between the Supreme
Court and the present courts of appeals. First is the argument in favor of
experimentation before making a permanent change in the structure of
the national judiciary. 5 Closely related and yet analytically distinguisha-
ble is the argument that something other than a permanent new court
84 See note 6 supra (H.R. 4482).
,s See note 88 infra.
' See note 90 infra.
,7 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 396.
' Leventhal, A Modest Proposal for a Multi-Circuit Court of Appeals, 24 AM. U.L.
REV. 881, 882 (1975).
89 2 COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, SECOND
PHASE 805, 806-13 (1974) (hearings) (testimony of the Honorable Frank M. Coffin)
[hereinafter cited as REVISION HEARINGS].
90 1 REVISION HEARINGS, supra note 89, at' 225 (testimony of the Honorable Floyd R.
Gibson).
Lay, Why Rush to Judgment?, 59 JUDICATURE 172, 179 (1975).
The View from an Inferior Court, Address by the Honorable Carl McGowan, Cali-
fornia State Bar Assoc., Annual Meeting, The Morrison Lecture (Oct. 12, 1981) [hereinafter
cited as View from an Inferior Court] (transcript on file in WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW
REVIEW office).
'" See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 396, 401, 405, 406 (Chief Justice Burger,
Justice White, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Powell, respectively); note 92 supra (Judge
McGowan).
' See note 6 supra (H.R. 4762, § (d)(1)-(2)).
's See View from an Inferior Court, supra note 92.
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will experience less difficulty during the inevitable start-up period."
During that period, the Justices of the Supreme Court understandably
will want to feel their way slowly in the exercise of their newly conferred
authority to refer cases for decision. Also, during the trial period the
relationship of the new court to the existing "inferior" courts will be
developed. Indeed, concern for the stature and prestige of the present
courts of appeals, conceivably at risk of being diminished by the
presence of a new court superior to them but inferior to the Supreme
Court, is an important reason for a less-than-permanent court." Finally,
the needs of economy and efficiency are always of concern but never
more than in the present climate of preoccupation with growing deficits
and the national debt. Each of these factors deserves careful considera-
tion; the credentials of the proponents as well as the intrinsic force of
the arguments require no less. Moreover, since we do not have a single
proposal offered as an alternative to a permanent national court of ap-
peals, but rather a range of alternatives, permitting and indeed requir-
ing significant choice in the shaping of legislation, each of the factors
must be weighed in terms of its potential to advance or to impede
achievement of the basic goal: improved capacity to provide clarity and
consistency in the national law.
One cannot seriously object to a provision requiring Congress to
evaluate the utility of the new court after a term of years, with abolition
the price of failure. Seven years, however, may be preferable to five.
The first term can be expected to be a start-up period and a report ade-
quate for a congressional decison would normally be expected at least
" See id
', See i& See also Leventhal, supra note 88, at 908. Judge Henry J. Friendly has
described the effect of a national court of appeals in the following terms:
Quite obviously creation of the National Court would decrease the prestige of the
courts of appeals and the consequent attractiveness of membership on them. This
is especially serious at a time when necessary increases in judgeships have
already impaired this to a considerable degree- not to speak of the problem of in-
adequate judicial salaries. You could well respond that creation of the National
Court ought not to have this effect since the plan would simply raise the percen-
tage of cases reviewed from say 6% to 12%, still less than the percentage of twen-
ty years ago. But such figures ignore the large, and vastly increased, proportion of
court of appeals cases that decide themselves. If one should assume that as many
as a third of the cases are of real legal interest, a percentage that is probably on
the high side, the figures would be more like 18% and 36% if the National Court
were established. Beyond that, the psychology of judges is not measurable by
statistics. Petty though it may be, a judge of a court of appeals does take satisfac-
tion in the fact that he is, and is publicly known to be, subject to correction only
by the 'one Supreme Court' we all revere. Of course, a diminution in prestige of
the courts of appeals would simply have to be borne if the National Court is really
needed. But it is a disadvantage that must be weighed since these courts will con-
tinue to be the work-horses of the federal appellate process.
Revision Hearing 1311, Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System
(April 22, 1975) (letter on file in WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW office).
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one full year before sunset. An adequate period for normal functioning
and development should be provided in the interim.
A requirement that eligibility for appointment to the national court
of appeals be limited to judges presently sitting on the circuit courts or
that the functioning of the new tribunal be evaluated by the Congress
after a term of years, with abolition the price of failure, hardly would af-
fect seriously the functioning of the new court as it goes about its
business of deciding cases referred to it by the Supreme Court. On the
other hand, if the membership of the inter-circuit tribunal were to be
picked at random from all federal appellate judges for each case referred
for decision-an alternative no one has proposed--the new court likely
could not contribute significantly to the stability or predictability of
federal law, whatever the nature of its docket.
There are many attractions to -the creation of an inter-circuit
tribunal composed entirely of judges presently sitting on the United
States courts of appeals who would assemble to hear cases as the de-
mands of the docket dictated. No need would arise for the full comple-
ment of support personnel, including additional law clerks and secretar-
ies, although it would be necessary to provide for the maintenance of a
separate docket and for the performance of other services provided by a
clerk's office." What is particularly attractive to some is the absence of
the need to appoint additional judges as in the case of the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals" and the Multidistrict Panel,' assignment
to the inter-circuit tribunal would be in addition to the normal duties of
each of the judges.
Here, a word of caution is appropriate. So long as the docket is small
and the burdens of this additional assignment not excessively onerous,
there would be much to be said for this procedure. If the docket of the
inter-circuit tribunal should grow, the pressures of a demanding addi-
tional assignment are likely to prove unacceptable. Judges are sensitive
to their obligations to their home courts and, as must be evident to any
observer of the federal judicial scene, the courts of appeals are already
burdened. Not every judge would, in any event, be willing to accept
assignment to an inter-circuit tribunal, and if such an acceptance implies
either an unfair workload on a judge's colleagues or excessive burdens
on the judge himself or herself, declinations probably would be common.
Clearly, availability of additional judicial resources to a home circuit,
by way of designation by the Chief Justice of visiting judges, would
alleviate the problem. These techniques, however, are already widely
" Compare the arrangements with respect to the Multi-District Panel, infra note 100.
" Section 211 of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, as amended by Economic
Stabilization Act of 1971, P.L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 748.
'® 28 U.S.C: § 1407 (1976). Section 1407 authorizes a judicial panel on multi-district
litigation to transfer civil actions in different districts involving one or more common ques-
tions of fact to a single district for coordinated or consolidated pretrail proceedings.
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used and there are limits on the available resources. Should the Con-
gress ever think well of providing some extra judgeships, the in-
cumbents being available for. nationwide service to fill particular
demands,'0 ' again the problem would be alleviated, but the savings
would be reduced. If the Congress establishes this new tribunal without
creating new judgeships, the workload should be monitored and added
resources provided when that proves necessary.
Perhaps the most important variable is the size of the panel of
judges constituting the inter-circuit tribunal. Under one model, the size
of the court itself could be large indeed, even in excess of twenty, with
panels for particular cases drawn from this larger group. Whatever the
size of the panel that would hear cases referred by the Supreme Court,
the fact that the sitting personnel would rotate would result in the un-
predictability of the decision as the court develops doctrine relevant to
the various issues presented to it. This inevitably invites relitigation,
both by the government and by individual litigants. It invites courts
obligated to consider the precedent of the inter-circuit tribunal as bin-
ding to make fine distinctions in the hope that a later panel will limit the
impact of a prior decision, short of over-ruling it. The larger the group
from which a panel hearing a particular case is drawn, the greater the
unpredictability and the uncertainty and the likelihood of relitigation.
An analogy can be found in the difficulties experienced by courts of ap-
peals with a large number of judges in maintaining uniformity in the law
of the circuit.
If it were considered desirable that no judge sitting on the circuit
court sit on the inter-circuit tribunal that reviews a case from his own
circuit,"2 it still might be possible to have a court constituted of nine
court of appeals judges with a minimum of seven sitting, always en banc.
The need for predictability also argues for a longer, rather than a
shorter, term. If a sunset provision of five years were to be built into
legislation creating the new court, each of the judges selected should be
selected for a full five year period. In the ultimate, staggered terms are
to be preferred to sharp variations in the personnel of the court at a par-
ticular point in time. If the experiment were to be for a longer period, ap-
pointment initially for a seven year term would be preferable to any
lesser period. Inevitably, resignations, disability, and other factors will
result in some changes in personnel, but change in the personnel of the
court should be minimized rather than facilitated. The desirability of a
rather long period of service argues against too heavy a reliance on
senior judges. Appointment of seniors appears, at first blush, to disrupt
their home circuits least, and yet the work which virtually every senior
judge does in the federal judicial system indicates that their removal to
an inter-circuit tribunal would entail a substantial cost in terms of
101 See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 2, at 233-36 & n.53.
102 H.R. 4762, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 61 (1981).
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judicial service available to the home court. Moreover, seniors are
available for assignment to other courts; their willingness to give of
themselves beyond what is called for under the law could be utilized to
good advantage in ways other than serving on the inter-circuit court.
Achieving Broad-Based Acceptability and Congressional Approval
It is certainly true that appointment to a permanent national court
of appeals would present a more attractive judicial assignment to in-
dividuals who might be somewhat hesitant to accept appointment to an
inter-circuit tribunal. It is also true, as many have pointed out, that rela-
tions with the judges now sitting on the courts of appeals would be ex-
pected to be far more congenial if the new court were appointed as a
temporary court, and if their own brethren and colleagues staffed the
new court. Again, these are factors which are likely to prove more
significant in the short run than in the long run, but easing the problems
of transition has much to commend it.
One cannot ignore the fact that the acceptability of a new tribunal,
not only within the federal judiciary, but by the profession as a whole
and by the Congress would be enhanced substantially if the court were
viewed as a five or seven year experiment. Those who are firmly con-
vinced that it will perform a necessary function should be willing to
recognize the political difficulties of creating, at one fell swoop, a na-
tional court interposed between the Supreme Court of the United States
and the several courts of appeals. Moreover, the advantage of moving
foward at this time, as opposed to waiting for another decade or two, or
even three, is significant: The increase in the order of magnitude of the
demands our society imposes on the federal judicial system is such that
we should no longer ignore the need for increasing the capacity of the
system to deal with contemporary problems. The time has indeed come
for the Congress to move forward, however cautiously and experimen-
tally, toward increasing the capacity of the system to provide for what
has aptly been termed, "the known certainty of the law," for as has been
said many centuries ago, "the knowne certaintie of the law is the safetie
of all." 3
"3 COKE, 1st INSTITUTE, BOOK 3, EPILOG 395A (1817).
19821

